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Laying Waste to Childhood
The Affective Potential of Destruction
Abstract
 This article is “posthumanist cartography,” (Braidiotti, 2018) of accidental 
thoughts and uncanny connections that emerged in thinking about affect, waste, 
and education. We move between philosophical theorizations, situated narratives, 
and disciplinary analyses, using these as a kaleidoscopic “spectrum through which 
we can capture the complexity of the ongoing processes of subject-formation” (p. 
36). In doing so, we explore how affective destruction can produce agency that 
effectuates relationships, creating potential new pasts and futures.
Keywords: affect theory, childhood, queer theory, trauma studies
Introduction
 Following similar turns in the social sciences and humanities, empirical and 
theoretical educational scholars have reconsidered visceral sensations and ephemeral 
intensities that occur in and through schooling. In this turn, affective intensities and 
embodied resonances are used to elaborate alternative approaches to knowing and 
being (see: Sobe, 2011; Fox and Alldred, 2015; Zemblyas, 2017). These projects 
have ethical and political teeth, and we appreciate how affect expands the ways 
educational theorists approach questions of subjectivity, causality, and ethics. In 
contrast to forms of knowing built upon a (White, Western, wealthy, able, cisgender, 
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straight…etc.) knowing rational human thinker that evidences the validity of their 
claims through scientific discourses of “objectivity,” affect opens up to marginalized 
ways of knowing and feeling. At the same time, we grappled with who, when, and 
affect is evidenced as knowledge in educational research.  
 Affects effectuate themselves in bodies, but we cannot experience the visceral 
effectuations of other bodies. Moreover, affective intensities effect different (human 
and non-human) bodies in different ways, and often transmit hegemonic ideologies 
of race, citizenship, gender, and economic systems (Ahmed, 2004; Bradiotti, 2018; 
Berlant, 2011; Hemmings, 2005; Thrift, 2008). This raises questions about the 
ethical and epistemological implications of decentering human subjective agency, 
as well the possibilities of doing so, including by scholars who engage in this work 
(e.g., Niccolini, A. D., Zarabadi, S., & Ringrose, J., 2018; Mayes, 2019;  Dernikos, 
B. P., Ferguson, D. E., & Siegel, M. (2019).  Similarly, we grapple with what one 
can say and know, about affect. As Stewart (2007) eloquently stated: “Things flash 
up—little worlds, bad impulses, events alive with some kind of charge. Sudden 
eruptions are fascinating beyond all reason, as if they’re divining rods articulating 
something. But what?” (p. 68).  To consider this question, in this paper we turn to 
the philosophical theorizations of affect using the ideas “waste” and “value.” 
Philosophical Affect
 As technical philosophical terms, both “affect” and its cognate “affection” 
diverge from how the words are commonly used and understood in important 
ways. Moreover, while there are some shared understandings of affect in different 
philosophical traditions, there is no singular Affect Theory. We unpack the everyday 
definitions of “affect” and “affection” because it is useful in general, and because 
our arguments for understanding “waste” and “value” as temporal constructions 
depend on an understanding of how “affect” operates differently in within different 
theoretical traditions.  
 
Affect is an Intensity  
 In its contemporary common usage, “affection” refers to positive emotion that a 
subject has for an object, often with the connotation of tenderness, as in, “Although 
I disagree with what they said, I have great affection for my cousin.” In philosophy, 
affects are decidedly and definitionally not emotions. In fact, this is the thread that 
unifies contemporary theorizations across philosophical traditions. Although affect 
is not a feeling itself, it can move bodies towards feelings. Philosophically, affect 
is a force that is part of a larger process of change and movement. In this sense, 
affect is not something that somebody has, but something that somebody does. 
For example, Neo-Darwinians use affect to Darwin to understand the connection 
between emotions and expressions and explore how these appear across various 
cultural contexts (Thrift, 2004, p. 64). In this model, affects serve to indicate uni-
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versal norms and elaborate an idea of the essential features of what it means to be 
“human.”   
 However, for Deleuzian affect, neither affects nor percepts are linked to peo-
ple—they are nonhuman intensities. The affect is a sensation, that exists in a “zone 
of indetermination” as a “nonhuman becoming of man” (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1991/1994, p. 69). Affect is the incorporeal body of being, whose (ever changing, 
flexible) parameters are delineated by its ability, in a given present, to act. Deleuzian 
ontological affect is not about representing or explaining components of human expe-
rience. It’s not that there is no subjective agency or experiences, but that subjectivity 
is in a state of intransitive becoming. Moreover, in this ontology, nothing is fixed.  
Affect Has Active (to Affect) and Passive (to be Affected) Components 
 In fact, both ordinary and philosophical definitions of affect imply an action. In 
common usage, to affect is to alter an object or influence a person’s feelings and to 
be affected is to be subject to such a change. One of the most often-cited definitions 
of affect in in the social sciences and humanities is of the following passage in A 
thousand plateaus (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980/1987): “We know nothing about a 
body until we know what it can do, in other words, what its affects are, how they 
can or cannot enter into composition with other affects, with the affects of another 
body” (p. 257).  
 There are two important details of this quote we want to point out. First, the 
“body.”  For Spinoza, as well as Deleuze and Guattari, this body is not a specifically 
or only a human body. Rather, affects are something that emerge from and converge 
from human, non-human, and more-than-human assemblages. Secondly, Spinoza’s 
original theorization of affect distinguished between affectus, (the power of affecting, 
of doing) and affectio (being subject to affects), a terminological distinction that 
has fallen away, but is useful to return to emphasize that affects have registers that 
imply different possibilities. How the “body” of affects are constituted and the range 
of their affective possibilities varies across different philosophical orientations. 
 Where biological, phenomenological, psychoanalytic understandings of 
pre-personal affect offer different frameworks to describe the constitutive discur-
sive-materials of subjective experience, Deleuzian affect is an ontological reframing 
of subjectivity altogether. For example, in psychoanalysis affects are drives that 
develop within individuals through a combination of personal and social histories 
and interactions. While “drives” is language from Freud, in contemporary psycho-
analytic drives can be any want or need that directs our actions. Affect is understood 
in terms of its ability to satisfy a drive or interrupt a drive (Hemmings, 2005, pp. 
551). Affects may be transmitted, but between humans, and “can thus be said to 
place the individual in a circuit of feeling and response.” (Hemmings, 2005, p. 552). 
The psychoanalytic model of affect shares important similarities with Deleuzian 
description of “affective intensities” in that it has a force that guides actions and a 
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relational component.  However, psychoanalytic affects are ontologically reactionary, 
whereas Deleuzian affects are ontologically originary.  
Affect Has Traces—Affect Thinks
 In addition, “affect” and “affection” commonly refers to something that can 
be observed, regardless of whether one experiences it firsthand—or even wants to 
be observing it—as in “public displays of affection.” Moreover, this observe-abil-
ity implies that the cause of the affectionate expression can be deduced based on 
contextual information, and following repetitions of similar events from which 
general patterns of causality can be inferred. For example, “they acted affection-
ately tonight” may mean something completely different if it is a statement about 
a set of colleagues who some suspect recently began an emotional rendezvous as 
compared to family members who recently had a falling out.  
 Thrift (2004) noted that across different philosophical orientations, “affect is 
understood as a form of thinking, often indirect and non-reflective” (p. 60). The 
question is, who is thinking? This question also has implications for considering 
inquiry practices on affect. If affect leaves its mark, how can we tell? For Deleuze, 
affect replaces subjectivity altogether, so affect does not describe a type of think-
ing, it is thought. “There never ‘remains’ anything of the subject, since it is to be 
created on each occasion, like a focal point of resistance, on the basis of the folds 
which subjectivize knowledge and bend each power” (Deleuze, 1988, p. 105). The 
process of subjectivation is created through “folds,” through a constant folding of 
the inside and the outside, which Deleuze also calls “auto-affection, the conversion 
of far and near” (1988, p. 118). This form of thinking resonates with our exploration 
of laying waste to our childhoods, which we explore shortly.  
Waste, Value, and Deleuzian Ontological Affect
 A determination of “waste” requires that some feature of a body (human or 
otherwise) can be defined by fixed criteria from which their value may be judged. 
This evaluation also has to occur in fixed time, not only an arresting of the present, 
but setting the past as unchangeable and the future as knowable and inevitable. 
When the thing that has been wasted is a material object, studies of non-human 
affective agency could be used to elaborate speculative alternative possibilities for 
understanding the agency of the object and its interactions. For example, a student 
may discard a completed and corrected assignment, and we can consider it “trash” 
or we can follow its journey to a landfill or a recycling bin and becomes a car-
board box. Alternatively, we could imagine a different journey were the corrected 
paper is kept by the student, filed away in a shoebox, perhaps found years later by 
someone, calling up a series of yet unknown responses. Moreover, “waste” does 
not only modify material configurations. We can be said to waste our breath, waste 
our time, waste our chances.  
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 To return to our hypothetical corrected paper, we can consider how it may be 
evaluated as a wasted learning opportunity if the student throws it away without 
reading comments. Then again, perhaps it would be a wasted learning opportunity 
if the comments impeded on critical thinking. This is the problematic of thinking 
“waste” in a Deleuzian ontology of immanence where the world and the “things” 
that constitute  the world all have a virtual, but real, creative potential to enter into 
relations and become differently. Every evaluation not only has to be made in an 
arrested historical present, it requires the projection of fixed potential possibilities. 
That is not to say that we cannot think about waste and affect in Deleuzian terms. 
However, we may be able to amend the concept of “waste” to better align with the 
movements of ontological affect as an agential potential for thinking and doing by 
considering waste as an action of “laying waste to.” Attending to destruction still 
requires some speculative thinking, however it offers one way to trace the effec-
tuations of incorporeal affect. In the wasteland of value, we consider the creative 
value of destruction through stories of our wasted childhoods.
Laying Waste to Our Childhoods
 Our childhoods were not dawdled away in idle activities or unappreciated fully 
in their time, but generatively laid waste to by us. We do not fall on the side of 
storytelling that suggests one can simply tell another what happened to them in the 
past, and that this past will then serve as an explanation for their adult identities. 
Instead, we wanted to tell stories of how a body could be formed and what it is a body 
could do. Taking bodily sensations as a way of knowing that includes but cannot be 
reduced to either individual psychological histories nor pre-individual social bodies 
of discourse or matter, our stories illustrate the expansively destructive ways we 
lay waste to our boyhoods and trouble assumptions about memory, childhood, the 
ability to change the past, and the malleability of the body. Our approach resonates 
with a comment Deleuze made at the beginning of his book on Spinoza:
What does Spinoza mean when he invites us to take the body as a model? It is a 
matter of showing that the body surpasses the knowledge that we have of it, and 
that thought likewise surpasses the consciousness that we have it. There are no 
fewer things in the mind that exceed our consciousness than there are things in 
the body that exceed our knowledge” (1988b, p. 18)
 In one case boyhood was one of constant fear of physical and verbal abuse 
from an addicted mother. These circumstances became the mysterious origin 
points of somatic symptoms later in life, revealing that the past does not exist in 
a specific time and place, or even in memory, but is an affection that haunts the 
body. Dislodging these affective traces becomes Elliot’s project and laying waste 
to boyhood reveals how subjects may wield affective thinking to rid the body of 
its affective traces. In the other case, boyhood was eclipsed by a girlhood. This is 
a transgender narrative about laying waste to gendered flesh, how doing so served 
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and serves as an anachronistic creation of childhoods. The “typical” transgender 
narrative, the story that offers transgender subjects legibility and authority, often 
relies on a bifurcation between the psyche’s rational knowledge of a gender identity 
and an oppressive discomfort of the flesh. The transgender adult must disavow their 
“wrongly” gendered childhood, positioning it to themselves and others as wasted 
time, opportunities, potentials. Mel’s story troubles this normative narrative. To be 
very clear: this is not to engage in a debate the “realness” of transgender subjects 
or experiences. Rather, it is a reconsideration of the temporal ontology of both 
“childhood” and the affective-potential of embodied knowledge.   
Evacuating Traumatic Haunts
 I have often told people that I had no childhood, without much thought or 
elaboration for what I meant. This is a fact that I felt suddenly embarrassed by 
when I recognized myself in Walkerdine’s (2003) description of one of one of her 
research subjects. She wrote: 
Why does she ‘forget’ this part of her own history? I suggest that she forgets her 
history for the same reason that she claims not to have had a childhood (‘Once 
I broke down and cried because I said I’ve had no childhood’; ‘I think I was an 
adult from birth’), that it is too difficult to bear the fact that she now ‘looks down’ 
on that part of herself .... Far easier to forget it, claim it didn’t exist in order to 
better remake herself as the country lady and career woman she should always 
have been. (pp. 245)
When I came across this notion, it felt familiar to me and it helped me theorize that 
making my own new adult existence could be merely in spirit of becoming sovereign 
over my somatic responses to my environment, not in the spirit to remake myself in 
the fashion that “should always have been,” as if there is some better subjectivity 
to be had, or some new identity to cling to.  
 All I wanted was my body to be more livable, which meant toying with the 
past, but not denying it. Until then, I lived with “Unwanted intensities simmer[ing] 
up at the least provocation” (Stewart, 2007, p. 47). Lots of things sent my body 
into paralysis where I could not move my arms, or else sent burning and shooting 
pains from my chest to my fingertips. Some of the things were the smell of smoke, 
Lucinda William’s music, drunk people, being rejected, being scolded, hair dryers 
and things that sound like them, the cardboard smell of package stores, white wine 
breath smell, darkness and nighttime. Each of these provocations had to do with my 
childhood in my mother’s house. She would drink to oblivion, hit me with a belt, 
burn me with hairdryers, threaten to kill herself. Given that these provocations are 
things associated with that environment at the time, but do not present any real 
danger to me currently, I prefer not to be provoked by them. 
 Years after my mom died, a strange affective event began to form when I 
was broken up with. In our final communications my body would react like it did 
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during a provocation from my childhood. My arm would have shooting pain any 
time I thought of this person, I had heart attack symptoms daily, and I could not 
eat. Desperate, I sought counseling and happened to go to someone who heard 
my symptoms and responded as if they were the most banal things possible. She 
questioned, “When was the first time you felt that pain in your arm?” I told her, I 
think it was when I would lay in bed at night as a child listening for my mom to slam 
into the hallway wall, which meant she was coming for me, but I have few details 
to give you about it. She would tell me not to talk too much and just to consider 
the idea of that scene. Then she would sit with her knees touching my knees and 
hold her hand in front of my face and I would follow it with my eyes, as I silently 
considered. I would follow for less than a minute, then we would stop. Many of 
these sessions happened this way, and often she asked me to think of my bodily 
symptoms as visualizations. Wherever the pain was, I was to picture it as an object, 
like fire or rock or whatever it looked like to me. Then I was to extinguish it or 
smash it so it could not live in my body anymore. Then I would think of a moment 
and follow her hand with my eyes. And within a few months, I still remembered 
some of the things my mother had done to me through that conceptual memory, but 
their traces in my present and in my body were vanished. They did not live in the 
present or future. I could be rejected, smell smoke, and listen to Lucinda Williams 
without my body going into crippling pain; in fact, my body did not react to those 
things in any notable fashion at all.  
 This was a commonplace treatment for PTSD called Eye Movement Desensiti-
zation and Reprocessing (EMDR), which deploys the affect of the body to evacuate 
somatic responses. Affect uniquely employs potential because it lingers in a zone 
away from representation, meaning it is not part of the makeup of our current life, 
but its mere existence creates the potential for some other life. It has some other 
meanings to it that don’t fit with what we already know, thus affect is potential not 
yet realized as material. It is crucial here though to understand that affect is no less 
real for the fact that it is not representable. In Deleuze and Guattari’s ontology, 
following Spinoza, affects are potential that become actualized in the body as per-
ceptions that can lead to cognitions and actions. When rendered unrepresentational, 
it is not simply “the ‘as yet unspoken,’” but literally “’unspeakable,’” a distinction 
Mowitt was interested in within trauma studies (Mowitt, p. 272).
 These concepts become useful for me understanding my “experience”; troubling 
the notions of what it means to be a “victim” of “trauma.” The modifications of my 
body have actually not erased the past, but the affects themselves opened up a world 
of nonrepresentational stuff that could be wasted to get toward a new potential. 
The wild somatic responses that live in the realm of affect tell us to pay mind to 
the body, and for those of us who can pay mind to the body and whose body is in 
a place where it could be molded, we can see waste in a way that rewrites some of 
the body’s response, but also rewrites what waste as a thing of creation. Rethinking 
the agential force of subjectivity over the affective responses of the flesh of the 
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body makes one move to undo the temporal disclosure that comes from valuation. 
Using EMDR to dis/juncture time and re-assemble some of the pre-individual as-
pect of affective traces that move through a body offers an example of considering 
the agential subjectivity that in line with a non-representational understanding of 
affect that still resists teleological logics of the potential of childhood.  
Refusing and Redoubling Childhoods Wasted 
 To be transgender is to be ready, at any moment, to provide an account of 
yourself. This is particularly true for Black and Latinx trans femmes, whose 
movements, affects, and language are more precariously positioned in front of the 
gaping jaws of justification. In Black on Both Sides, C. Riley Snorton resurfaces 
an archive of black fugitive slave narratives and reads them through a transgender 
analysis to “illustrate how the inhabitation of the un- gender- specific and fungible 
also mapped the affective grounds for imagining other qualities of life and being” 
(2017, pp. 58-59). For Snorton, the economic fungibility of captive bodies is exactly 
the paradox that allows/forces the commoditized body, and the legacy of a body 
that has been violently defined by its exchange-value in the post-slavery economy, 
to find ways to escape dominant logics. Laying waste to the expected transgender 
development narrative may offer a similar evasion. 
 There are two main venues for trans subjects to seek validation, value and so-
cial-worth, so often correlated with bodily precarity: (1) the scientific verifications 
of a true, unassailable natural fact of gender that located within the matter of the 
body—including the grey matter of the brain, and (2) the confessional narrative 
of a self-aware subject. These options equate knowledge and knowing to either 
a purely scientific or phenomenological realm. In doing so, the “original” body 
becomes positioned as a natural given. Moreover, shame and waste and potential 
all get stirred up. Take for example, the statement I have had cheerily offered to 
me: “oh, you had such a pretty face, such a shame to waste it!” The shame is my 
wasted “real” body, and concomitant gendered norms inscribed on it and the failure 
to actualize them appropriately.  
 I mention that these comments are offered with good-nature, because in my 
experience they are. Even “progressive” folks, allies (self-proclaimed and those 
that show up in action) who want to affirm my gender identity, who want to be 
corrected, want to know when they can do to do better; often just as badly they 
want to know more than that as well. While most people are polite enough not to 
ask about another person’s genitals, there is a desire to know “when” and “how” the 
transgender subject becomes. Perhaps because if I can give an adequate accounting 
of myself, my confidence in my own gender may be enough to also assure the cis-
gender person about their own. The “pleasure” or affective transmissions of desires 
that invokes this tale follow their own logics that also intersect with teleological 
notions about childhood potential.
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 Optimally in my confession, I can tell you that from a young age I simply knew 
that I was in the wrong body. If I can trace the knowledge back to childhood, as 
a cisgender listener, you can be rest-assured that the threat to your own gendered 
body has sufficiently passed. In addition, or in lieu of that storyline I can also 
choose to invoke an innocent childhood body wrecked in misery by providing a 
long list of embodied and psychic despairs that wretched my childhood before I 
was saved by having a name to give to what I had previously assumed was my own 
private deformation. In an inversion from our typical developmentalist notions of 
children’s limited knowledge as compared to adults, transgender adults are often 
granted more legitimacy if they indicate that they were certain of their true and 
essential gender identity as children.    
 I never carried the narrative or ideas that I was always boy trapped in a girl’s 
body, my childhood was not one marked by the knowledge that it was the ’wrong 
kind’ of childhood. However, as I began laying intentional waste to a particular 
type of feminized body I also was compelled through social norms and individuals’ 
curiosities to develop a narrative, an evaluation, of my childhood that provided—or 
was the same as—the valuation of my subjectivity in a present. Riding the spikes 
and waves of pre-personal affects, I was coaxed and bursting to confess a litany 
of gender-transgressions. Something funny happened in this process, I found that 
crystal clear memories of a boyhood were presenting themselves to me. For exam-
ple: health class where I was horrified by the idea of menstruating; co-ed soccer 
teams and schoolyard games; my Batman-themed kindergarten lunchbox and 5th 
birthday party; the deeply textured memory of wanting to have a short haircut and 
a different name when I was 4 years old, sitting in the mustard-colored room of 
the house of a preschool classmate, who I had not thought of once until the story 
was spilling out of me. These moments are all true, or rather real. However, they 
are not instances that point to the higher truth of my boyhood, whose potential for 
actualization was wasted. 
 Nor was my “girl”hood a waste. There may have been shame, but it was not a 
waste, a weight shed simply through laying waste to my body. Queer theorists noted 
that we should be wary on being seduced too deeply into unproblematically repeating 
the narrative of the “plasticity” of transgender bodies, which can risk to appear trans-
gressive when in fact it is constitutive  of the logics of neo-liberal market economies 
that  a the subject to efficiently and independently produce their selves (Halberstam, 
2004; Puar, 2017). We do well to heed cautions for how easily notions of embodied 
agency can slip into hegemonic logics. Instead, I focus on how the act of laying waste 
to the flesh affectively created a boyhood I never had by laying waste to the flesh of 
my “girl”hood, and changed my embodied and rational affective powers and disrupts 
the chronological and teleological of “childhood” itself.   
 With the removal of my chest, I became awash in new memories of my past. 
I say new because it was not like I had forgotten something, like where I put my 
keys or my friend’s birthday. Rather, I thought, felt, and remembered things I had 
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never experienced. For example, the flush of embarrassment and shame when I 
remember having to use communal showers in summer camp, and the dawning 
realization of how intensely I had disassociated from parts of my body. In look at 
photos, I looked in the mirror and saw fleshy bits of myself for first time, coming 
into focus right along with the blind and blurry spots that only appeared after they 
were gone. I had no idea what a body could feel, in how it could create itself.  
 It wasn’t until I had top surgery that I had access to the knowledge of my body. 
By this I am consciously not using the term “gender-confirming” surgery, resisting 
the idea that my gender was indeed confirmed. I did not free my essential self from 
their fleshy cage, revealing the “real” me there all along. There were though, of 
course, physical changes that are notable for the way they changed my powers of 
affecting and being affected. I had less chronic pain. I was cold more often and 
overheated less because I wasn’t wearing four layers every day. It was rarer for 
me to spend a half hour trying on seven different shirts to decide what to wear, or 
to have found myself unable to move from where I lay on the bed, overwhelmed 
because everything I tried unleashed a crawling of my flesh that seemed to have 
started in and set bone-deep. This is a quick survey of sensation and pre-personal 
intensities, of the physical, social, and psychic terrains that constitute a becom-
ing-subjectivity. I want though to resist the pull to demarcate the “before” and 
“after” times of surgery, were “before” was a floundering miserable wasting and 
the “after” a liberatory self-actualization. Instead, I continue to return to different 
versions of my childhood to lay waste to them, and see what they are made of. In 
rejecting the idea of a newly-minted co-constructed “lost boyhood,” I am finding 
new emergent versions of girlhood and boyhoods. Once I laid waste to the body, 
knowledges and pasts emerged; not an exposure of wasted time nor a liberation 
from wasted experiences but a creation, a re-doubling.
 Deleuze and Guattari trouble the normative idea that there is a type of pure 
childhood that sits within a distinct adult self. Instead of being informed by a 
pure idea of the past. Rather, the child is the contemporaneous occurrence “of the 
adult and the child, their map of comparative densities and intensities, and all the 
variations on that map” that co-exist to create the subject, or the “body without 
organs” (1980/1987, p. 164). Which furthermore, is “never yours or mine. It is 
always a body, no more projective than regressive. It is an involution, but always 
a contemporary, creative involution” (1980/1987, p. 164). For both of us there is 
potential in thinking of the agential temporality of affect, laying-waste to flesh and 
bodies, rupturing and reconfiguring past.
The Threat of the Child’s Potential
 The third strand of thinking that informed this article is an affective anxiety that 
appears to haunt education, writ large. The potential of wasting students’ potentials 
seem to lurk in the language during conference presentations and in journal articles, 
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buzz underneath conversations in preservice teacher education courses, and justify 
educational policy (“No child left behind,” “every child succeeds”).  This is not sur-
prising, as the idea of schooling is itself emerged in Western philosophy to respond 
to the theorization of the child as an innocent subject; the result of humanism and 
Romanticism and a departure from the notion that all children were born already 
blemished by original sin, and therefore in need of discipline and cleansing (Singer, 
2005; Davis, 2011). As Edelman (2004) noted, the figure of the child has become 
a “privileged emblem” in contemporary Western world, as an image that is also a 
promise that upholds a naturalized system of values in moral economy (p. 58). 
 The responsibility for education to safeguard and ensure childrens’ potential 
runs through all models of education and schooling. As Singer (2005) noted, even 
progressive and emancipatory forms of education that seek to re-inscribe students 
with agency can find that their programs “deteriorate into rigid methods and 
orthodoxy” (p. 616) in a frantic determination to ensure that their students will 
develop into the “right” type of fully-formed adult. In light of the prevalence of 
developmentalist and teleological model of childhood in education, Greteman and 
Wojcikiewciz (2014) suggested that the figure of a coherent child offered a “site 
of resistance” wherein one could embrace incompleteness, thus forcing the idea 
of coherence into question (p. 559). Deleuze and Guattari also drew connections 
between affect, children, and a disruptive potential of thinking in new ways. 
 In A thousand plateaus (1980/1987) Deleuze and Guattari commented,  “chil-
dren are Spinozists” and “Spinozism is the becoming-child of the philosopher” (p. 
256), because children approach the world by understanding its components not 
as a series of categorical attributes, but as a series “of active and passive affects in 
the contexts of the individual assemblage it is part of ” (p. 257). Furthermore, for 
Deleuze and Guattari, this understanding of affect has the potential to break with 
representational thinking and its assumptions about a subject’s essential features and 
teleological possibilities, “to solve a problem from which all exits are barred” (p. 
259). This potential, they argued, is overlooked by psychoanalytic understandings 
of affect and subjectivity, which would return us to the more common usages of 
the term discussed earlier: as the emotional or feelings that a person is subject to. 
Conclusion
 Thinking with and about affect in education could start with considering what 
seems too precious to lose and play with destroying it anyways, to see what may 
emerge.  For example, Burman (2019) recently advocated for “‘childhood as method’ 
as an “a specific application of postcolonial theory to educational studies” (p. 5)  by 
considering how “the cultural-historical and material conditions for the formulation 
of theories and models of childhood”  are imbricated in particular “ethical-political 
practices involved in the crafting, interpretation, and application and reception of 
research” on childhood/children (p. 6). In a similar vein, Dumas (2018) used Afro 
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Pessimism and its re-temporalizing of Slavery as the contemporary and affective 
dimension of Anti-Blackness, to rethink “the ontological position of Black people” 
at large, as well as within in educational policy (p. 13). In doing so, he lays waste to 
the narratives of racial progress. Focusing on the ways that Black bodies are and have 
been laid waste to, Dumas (2018) also reframes problems of inequity and racism as 
impossible situations that can nevertheless open up to generative new analytics. 
 We in no way deny the reality that children often come under great harm. 
Indeed, one of our childhoods reflected that reality. Nor do we believe that it is 
simple to disentangle the affects that create vulnerable bodies from the effectuated 
violences they are subject to. If the limits of a body are its ability to affect and 
being affected, laying waste to a body (human, non-human or more-than-human) 
is an experimentation with its limits and opens the potential to think and therefore 
create something radically new as well. 
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